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ABSTRACT: Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion 
of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating 
the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an 
argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, 
requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE VIRTUES OF OSSA 
 
I would be remiss if I did not begin by expressing my deep gratitude to the 
conference organizers for the opportunity to be one of this year’s keynote speakers. 
It is a privilege and honor, but the responsibility has caused me no end of 
sleeplessness for many months now. More than that, however, I would like to thank 
Tony and Ralph and Chris and Hans, and now Cate, for the dedication and energy 
they have invested in establishing and sustaining this conference over the years, and 
for their important, intelligent, and graceful contributions to the field of 
argumentation theory. 
I have grown especially fond of the OSSA conference because not only has it 
been an exemplary forum for thinking and learning and, of course, arguing, about 
good argumentation, but it has also been a showcase for good argumentation. The 
system of commentators, together with the opportunity for replies in the 
Proceedings, and the culture of collegiality all bring out the best in us as arguers. It 
has fostered the exchange of ideas and provided the chance to argue, reflect and 
revise, all within an open and supportive environment. To put it in more timely 
words, this conference brings out the virtues of argumentation and puts them on 
display. 
Not surprisingly, then, OSSA has been an occasion for some very good 
arguments – some very, very good arguments. On at least a couple of occasions, 
arguments so good that they left me almost speechless – so satisfied that there was 
nothing left to say.  
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Think about that for a moment: an argument that can leave a philosopher 
speechless? Now that’s a good argument.1 
We could take that as a starting point – the idea of an argument so good that 
it completely satisfies its participants – but let us be less presumptuous and take it 
as a starting goal. 
Instead, let me start with the conference theme: the Virtues of 
Argumentation. It is a phrase rich with meanings, reflecting some of the different 
ways we can think about arguments. Two readings in particular stand out: First, it 
can be read as referring to the various positives attributes that argumentation has 
as a means of settling disputes, as a method for arriving at truths, or for any of the 
many other ways in which argumentation is a good thing. Alternatively, it can be 
interpreted as referring to the virtues exhibited by arguers in arguments, rather 
than by argumentation. What positive attributes are exhibited by arguers when 
those arguers are arguing well? 
Is there anything more than an accidental, homonymic connection between 
these two ways of reading the phrase, “the virtues of argumentation”? The question 
of how good arguing is conducive to what arguing is good for cannot be ignored 
when trying to answer the question of how good arguing could lead to arguments 
that are good – especially when the goal is arguments that are that good. The larger 
question of the nature of argumentation informs all subsidiary discussions, so if we 
focus too narrowly on either good arguments or good arguing, we run the risk of 
missing something important. 
So, what I would like to do is connect virtuous arguing with satisfying 
arguments and the value of argumentation. There are, then, three bearers of value to 
ask about: 
 
 What makes an arguer praiseworthy; 
 What makes an argument praiseworthy; 
 What makes argumentation praiseworthy. 
 
Now that’s what I would like to do, but unfortunately, I lack the talents to succeed at 
such an ambitious project. Mercifully, I lack the hubris to even try, so, instead, I will 
focus more narrowly on the virtues of virtue as a tool for theorizing. Virtues, I shall 
argue, provide a particularly good lens for thinking about our questions, but 
ultimately there are limits to their theoretical utility. They cannot underwrite a 
complete account. 
 
2. WHENCE VIRTUES? 
 
The history of my thoughts about virtue and argument runs right through OSSA, so if 
you will indulge me just a little longer, I’d like to rehearse some of that history 
because I think it helps to explain how we can get from thinking about arguments to 
thinking about virtues, why the field of argumentation and virtues is so fertile, but 
also why in the end we will need to move beyond traditional thinking about virtues. 
                                                        
1 This notion of argument was introduced in Cohen 2008. 
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The first mention that I heard of “Virtue Argumentation” came in 2006. I had 
presented a paper at the 2005 OSSA meetings about a peculiar class of especially 
bad arguments that I labelled “Backfiring Arguments” because the effect they end up 
having is to lower rather than enhance the credibility of their target conclusions. It 
takes a heroically bad arguer to pull that off, and I explored some of the features of 
arguers that could lead to contribute to that sort of misfire. The principal virtue of 
that paper was that it managed to elicit a very good response from Andrew 
Aberdein, the OSSA-assigned commentator. Aberdein built upon that commentary in 
the paper he presented the next year at ISSA in Amsterdam entitled, “Virtue 
Argumentation.”2 In that presentation, he referred to my paper and to me as, and I 
quote, “a virtue argumentation theorist avant la letter.” He then announced that he 
was in fact publicly “outing me” as a Virtue Argumentation Theorist.  
Prior to that, I had not thought about the connection between Virtue 
Epistemology and Argumentation Theory, so for that piece of generous 
“hermeneutical ventriloquism” I am very grateful. The juxtaposition of those ideas 
helped crystallize my thoughts and bring into focus two distinct but convergent 
pathways from virtues to arguments. 
 
3. A TRADITIONAL STORY 
 
The first, shorter path linking virtues and arguments is best told in a story. It’s an 
old story, one that some of you have undoubtedly heard before, quite possibly from 
me because it is one that I rather enjoy telling. I think it bears repeating: 
 
Many years ago, at one of the large synagogues in New York serving a congregation of 
immigrants from around the world, there was a heated dispute that threatened to tear 
the congregation apart. Should the canonical prayer, Shema Y’Isroel, be recited seated 
or standing? Rather than let the argument destroy the congregation, they all agreed to 
defer to the Rabbi who would be hired when their current one, who was already quite 
old, retired. The time came and they conducted an exhaustive international search, 
settling on a Rabbi with an impeccable reputation as a brilliant scholar. When he 
arrived at the temple, he was immediately surrounded by elders from the 
congregation. 
“Rabbi, Rabbi,” one elder asked, “Isn’t it traditional for the Shema to be said 
while seated?” 
The Rabbi paused, stroked his beard, and then said, “No, that is not the 
tradition.” 
“Aha!” another elder exclaimed. “So we were right! The tradition is to stand 
when reciting the Shema, isn’t that so, Rabbi?” 
“No, that is not the tradition either,” came the reply. 
“But, Rabbi,” said another, “we’ve been arguing about it for years!” 
“That’s the tradition!” 
 
If you are like me and find nothing especially conceptually odd about the idea 
of recreational argument, then perhaps you’ll also find nothing odd about a tradition 
of arguing either, but there is indeed something peculiar about it. It’s not just that 
some of the details of the Talmudic tradition of pilpul argumentation are so 
                                                        
2 The paper was later published as Aberdein 2010. 
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interestingly idiosyncratic. The same can be said about the Buddhist Gelukpa 
tradition of argumentation (rtsod pa) or any other argument-centered tradition. The 
oddity is in the very idea of a tradition of argument. Isn’t arguing about differences 
while traditions are about community? Yes, and it is true that one of the things that 
arguments can do is resolve differences, but in order for arguing to be a positive 
constituent of a tradition, arguing cannot be understood simply as a way of 
eliminating (negative) differences. Nor can it be thought of as a means to truth and 
knowledge or even as a manifestation of an individual’s rationality. Arguing would 
have to be a way of participating in the community. If arguing is to be part of a 
tradition, it cannot be about who I am or what I do; it’s about who we are and what 
we do. We argue with one another, not in isolation.  
It is the doing not the deed that matters, and the doing is a communal effort. 
Admittedly, when I say this, I have tipped my hand. I am not thinking of 
arguments as abstract structures of inferentially connected propositions. Otherwise, 
simply presenting valid arguments would make one part of the tradition, but that is 
not so. It’s not enough to walk around saying, “Socrates is Greek; All Greeks are 
mortal; Therefore Socrates is mortal.” That isn’t arguing: it isn’t honoring a tradition; 
it’s being eccentric. 
Obviously, something more is needed to make logical inferences into 
dynamic, vital arguments capable of centering a tradition. And that something more 
is arguing with others. But even that is not enough, otherwise being excessively 
argumentative would make one a pillar of the community! What’s needed is not just 
arguing with others, but doing it well, that is, virtuously.  
 
4. UP AND DOWN APPROACHES TO ARGUMENT 
 
The path that I in fact followed from arguments to virtues was more of a long and 
winding road, with a detour through what probably deserves to be called a “weird 
methodology.” 
 The methodological challenge for argumentation theorists is that 
argumentation is manifestly not a single phenomenon, nor even a single multi-
faceted phenomenon. It is a heterogeneous set of many different phenomena, many 
of which are themselves multi-faceted. The great diversity of facets and phenomena 
requires a plurality of paths into the discussion, and as a community we have 
responded in kind. Logic, rhetoric, and dialectic may be the most prominent 
approaches we have developed, but there are others. There are linguistic and 
sociological dimensions to argumentation; the anthropology of argumentation is no 
less a part of a complete account of argumentation than its psychology; and even if 
we accept the assumption that epistemology provides the ultimate telos of 
argumentation, that does not license us to ignore the ethics of argumentation or its 
juridical and political aspects.  
 We can draw a rough-and-ready distinction between two general classes of 
strategies for approaching arguments, “top-down” and “bottoms-up.” Top-down 
theorists begin with an idea of what an argument is or ought to be. That conception 
can then serve up criteria for what makes a given argument praiseworthy. 
Normative principles for good argumentation can be extracted by a straightforward 
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conceptual analysis and then deployed in particular cases. In practice, the initial 
conceptualization does not have to be held as fully sacrosanct, and the give-and-take 
between the initial assumptions and the results from application will sharpen or 
otherwise enhance the initial concepts. There is room for the dynamics that lead to 
reflective equilibrium and a stable theory that is yet capable of further evolution. 
The proof of the work of top-down theorists can be found in the templates 
they have provided and the principles that have emerged. A lot of first-rate 
theorizing falls under this rubric and there is no denying the extraordinary 
magnitude and extent of the successes that have been achieved this way. 
 We have also been the beneficiaries of very impressive contributions by 
those working from the other end of the spectrum. The technology is in place for 
dedicated researchers to make a thorough corpus analysis or to conduct extensive 
empirical studies, and we are fortunate to have such careful scholars among us 
whose hard work and systematic data collection transcend the inherent biases of 
anecdotal data selection. 
The proof of the work of bottoms-up theorists can also be found in the 
principles that have emerged and the templates they have provided. A lot of first-
rate theorizing falls under this rubric and there is no denying the extraordinary 
magnitude and extent of the successes that have been achieved this way. 
 
5. THE WEIRD ROAD TO VIRTUES 
 
Lacking the rigor and analytical insights of Top-down theorists as well as the 
perseverance and synthesizing abilities needed for empirical Bottoms-up research, I 
have had to cobble together a mixed approach. Beginning at one end, I have focused 
on what I suppose are “weird” arguments in the hopes that something about the 
entire class can be discerned from exploring the outliers, oddities, extreme cases, 
and pathological deformities that mark the boundaries. I have mentioned one class 
already, Backfiring Arguments, but I have also been intrigued by such curious 
examples as: 
 
 Arguing with God where you know you can’t win; 
 Arguing with Oneself where you really can’t lose; 
 Walkover Arguments where you win too easily, but there might not be 
anything to win; 
 Academic Arguments where it seems no one ever really wins, but 
there’s really not much at stake to win or lose, anyway; 
 Filibusters where one party refuses to play at all – and makes sure that 
no one else gets to play either; 
 Desperation Arguments where normal strategies can be thrown out 
the window because you’ve almost certainly lost already so there’s 
nothing left to lose; 
 Misbegotten Arguments where there’s an argument, but there 
shouldn’t be one, so simply choosing to argue is already an 
argumentative failure; 
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 Impossible Arguments that cannot be won by argumentation and can 
only be resolved by something other than argument, e.g., by a 
wholesale, radical epistemic conversion rather than a more localized 
standpoint adjustment – but have to be argued regardless; 
 Missing Arguments where there’s no argument, but there should be 
one, so in this case it is the decision NOT to argue that is the 
argumentative failure; 
 Misfit Arguments by the wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong 
time about the wrong thing, i.e, arguments that are Misplaced, 
Displaced, and Out-of-place. 
 
 I find all of these cases individually fascinating, and collectively helpful when 
thinking about all the different aspects of arguments and all the ways that things can 
wrong in an argument. In each case, something is deficient or completely missing 
that should be there or else something is exaggerated or present that shouldn’t be 
there at all. These arguments are unsatisfying, regardless of whether they merit any 
of the honorifics we normally bestow on arguments, like valid or sound or cogent or 
kosher. 
The job then becomes one of trying to locate the intruding or missing pieces 
that make the argument less than fully satisfying. That is, these examples lead us to 
ask: What virtue is missing? And What vice is present?  
And that returns us to the earlier question as to what it would be for an 
argument to be fully satisfying. What would make an argument satisfying to the 
point that the participants could say at the end, “Now that was a good argument”? 
An awful lot of pieces have to fall into place for an argument to be that good. 
 
6. “NOW THAT WAS A GOOD ARGUMENT.” 
 
The most obvious – and most important – thing to say about an argument that is so 
good that in the end the arguers agree on how good the argument was, is that it 
must have some extraordinary arguers! It is an exceptional arguer who can see the 
epistemic gains to be had, and thus be satisfied by, losing an argument, and it is 
equally admirable for a winning arguers to appreciate the contributions made by 
her opponent to whatever epistemic gains she has made. 
The notion of an argument that is fully satisfying to its participants includes 
more than epistemic gains. It has to at least extend to cognitive gains more broadly, 
including emotional, ethical, and possibly aesthetic aspects as well. It is a 
conceptually rich deposit for theorists to mine. In order to excavate that wealth we 
need to decide what counts as an argument, who counts as a participant, and, most 
of all, what counts as satisfying. I will begin with and focus on the last one because it 
informs and integrates the other two. 
We can take a cue for the idea of a fully satisfying argument from The 
GoodWork project of psychologists Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, William Damon, and 
Howard Gardner (The GoodWork Project: http://goodworkproject.org). They note 
that when we speak of “good work” we may have technical competence in mind: we 
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hire master craftsmen precisely because they can be expected to do good work. We 
might instead be commenting on whether it is engaging, rewarding, or satisfying for 
the workers: we all want good jobs – good work – in that sense. And we could also be 
judging that the work is ethical: people who volunteer their time in soup kitchens or 
hospitals are doing good work. It is easy enough to separate the different senses – as 
I have just done – but I think some damage is done both conceptually and practically 
if we accept that fragmentation without any resistance. Our lives and works should 
be more integrated than that. 
The same thing needs to be said about good arguments. There is, of course, 
great clarity to be gained by analytically distinguishing such elements as the 
technical competence in arguments from the cognitive gains to be brought about by 
arguing or the ideal conduct of arguers during arguments or the satisfactoriness of 
its resolution. But there is also the potential cost of losing the forest for those trees.  
Suppose, for example, we focus exclusively on technical competence, 
something like inferential validity. It becomes all-too-easy to lose sight of the 
dialectical, rhetorical, and other dimensions of argumentation. Here’s an example of 
an argument offered by a leading logic text: “Both Pierre and Marie Curie were 
physicists. Therefore, Marie Curie was a physicist.”3 
 Really? That’s your example of a good argument?! 
I suppose it could serve as an example of a good inference, but as an argument, it 
leaves so much to be desired that one wonders how it could even be offered as an 
example of an argument in the first place. Only someone with logical blinders on – 
like the author of an introductory logic text – would consider it. I cannot imagine 
someone walking away from an exchange that include the words, “Both Pierre and 
Marie Curie were physicists. Therefore, Marie Curie was a physicist,” saying to 
herself, “Wow, that was one heck of a good argument!” 
The relevant concept of an argument that is implicated by the robust concept 
of a fully satisfying argument, therefore, cannot be the logical notion of a valid 
inference. Good inferences do not by themselves make good arguments.  
As an aside, and more controversially, I also think that bad inferences do not 
necessarily ruin an argument. First, it would have to be recognizably bad inferences, 
rather than merely invalid ones, that would disqualify an argument. But even that 
might not be enough.  
Under certain circumstances, it is not necessarily unreasonable to overlook 
an argument’s flaws. One might, for example, resort to a meta-argument like this: “I 
can see that the argument doesn’t work as it stands, but the conclusion is so attractive 
that I’m sure someone will be able to fix it. I’ll accept this flawed one for now.” The 
French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré suggested that he sometimes 
operated this way: accepting a formula as a provisional lemma in proving theorems 
before he had any proof for that lemma.  
There is a negative counterpart to the reasoning here that is actually fairly 
common: a meta-argument for rejecting apparently good arguments, the “MARGA 
gambit.” We find it on display whenever someone rejects a supposed sophistry 
without being able to identify the specific problem: “I can’t find anything wrong with 
                                                        
3 The author’s name is withheld out of respect. 
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this proof that 1=0, but I know that can’t be right, so I’m confident that a competent 
mathematician could find the error, so I’ll reject it even though it looks perfectly good 
to me.” 
Valid reasoning is apparently neither necessary nor sufficient for an 
acceptable argument. Still, the degree of acceptability is limited. Provisionally 
accepting an unproved lemma falls well short of “fully satisfying.” Fully satisfying is 
a very high standard. 
Similar examples can be found or generated to show that exclusively 
rhetorical, dialectical, epistemological, or ethical criteria for good argumentation 
also fail to capture the robust concept. Winning arguments, for example, do not 
necessarily qualify as good arguments in this rich sense: If the loser of an agonistic 
does not walk away satisfied – and how often does that happen? – then there is 
some dissatisfaction, so it is not fully satisfying. For that matter, how often is the 
nominal winner of an argument satisfied? If there is nothing to gain from a 
“walkover argument” against an overmatched or incompetent opponent, at least 
from an epistemic perspective, then whatever satisfaction is to be had is limited. 
Even rationally persuasive arguments can leave a bad taste in one’s mouth. Again, 
this is a very high standard.  
Virtuous argumentation does fare better on this count if only because the 
arguers will have the appreciable satisfaction of having argued well. But even then, I 
shall argue, something is still be missing. 
To be fair, argumentation theorists have generally avoided these sorts of 
one-dimensional characterizations of what makes a good argument, so admittedly I 
am taking shots at an army of Straw Men here. But I can always use the reminder to 
widen my perspective. The concept of a good argument is a complex, multi-faceted 
one. In the jargon of contemporary philosophy, it is a “thick” concept: it 
encompasses both strictly descriptive components and loaded normative ones. 
 
7. THE CAST OF ARGUERS 
 
If we are going to invoke the idea of an argument that is fully satisfying, we cannot 
then turn around and think of arguments as abstract structures of propositions. For 
starters, there have be arguers to be (or fail to be) satisfied. And we need to expand 
the category of “arguer” to include everyone who is relevant for the judgment that 
an argument is, or is not, fully satisfying. Two criteria for relevance present 
themselves:  
 
(1) anyone who has the standing to evaluate the argument itself as being 
satisfactory or not. 
(2) anyone whose conduct is properly subject to being evaluated as 
satisfactory or not. 
 
By and large, these criteria identify many of the same people. The proponents of a 
standpoint and their opponents are included by these criteria, and so are any third-
party interlocutors. In addition, these criteria also include judges, juries, and 
interested spectators. In some contexts, it would make sense to extend the list even 
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further so as to include any party with an interest in the outcome, but it might be 
best not to open that can or worms now – if only because when the argument 
concerns environmental issues, actual worms could qualify as interested parties and 
therefore participants in the argument. Let it suffice for the moment simply to 
emphasize that when it comes to including different perspective in the overall 
evaluation of an argument, the wider the net, the better.  
In another context, I labelled some of these other parties “non-combatants” 
to distinguish them from the primary protagonists (Cohen, forthcoming). Part of the 
reason for that terminology was to exploit the dominant argument–is-war 
metaphor, and to show that despite its significant defects – and the significant 
pleasure that many of us have had in pointing out those defects – there is still new 
and useful meaning to be extracted from the argument-is-war metaphor. The idea of 
non-combatants implicates the related concept of “collateral damage” – and that is 
an idea that can fruitfully be transplanted from the military sphere to the discourse 
of argumentation. Here, however, I will label them “supporting actors” in order to 
highlight their secondary roles as well as their secondary contributions to the overall 
performance.  
Each of the two criteria just noted provides a compelling reason to count 
these supporting actors alongside proponents and their opponents as part of the 
cast of characters in an argument. First, they have a stake in the argument. Thus, 
they have the standing to make a judgment as to the satisfactoriness of the 
argument. They may not have as much to say about the argument as the proponents 
and opponents but that does not mean that they don’t have anything to say. 
Consider a legal case: If the judge and jury are not satisfied with the argumentation, 
that tells us something; if the defendants or plaintiffs have complaints about their 
counsels’ argumentation, that matters, too; and if the spectators find it lacking, that 
also counts. 
Second, in addition to having a stake in the argument, the supporting actors 
add something of their own to the argument. And it cuts both ways. Knowledgeable 
audiences, fair-minded judges, and conscientious juries can be significant, positive 
factors in the success of an argument. Conversely, incoherent proponents and 
intransigent opponents are not the only ones who can spoil an argument; biased 
arbitrators, incompetent juries, and uninformed, unappreciative, or ill-behaved 
audiences have that power, too. 
 
8. DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS 
 
In addition to the two antecedent reasons for counting supporting actors as arguers, 
namely their stakes in the outcome and their contributing roles in producing that 
outcome, there is an another benefit to thinking along these lines that gives a degree 
of posterior confirmation to that decision. It casts a bright light that clarifies the role 
of the virtues in argumentation and thereby brings the concept of an arguer’s 
virtues into clearer focus. In so doing, it highlights the strengths of virtue an 
analytical tool.  
At the same time, however, it also reveals limits to what virtue 
argumentation theory can do. 
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First, the positive part: the core ideas of Virtue Argumentation Theory, as I 
understand it, can fit on a couple of bumper stickers. First, 
For a good argument, argue well. 
The grammatical shift from the adjective “good” to the adverb “well” signals a 
change in focus from the argument as a product to the arguer as an agent. Virtue 
Argumentation Theory zeroes in on the conduct of the arguers, rather than on 
propositions, rules, inferences, procedures, or even outcomes, as the heart of 
argument evaluation. Everything else branches off from there. The second bumper-
sticker slogan is: 
 Arguing well requires good arguers. 
The return to an adjective, applying now to the arguers, signals that the admirable 
conduct of arguers ought to stem from virtues, inculcated habits of mind, rather 
than be accidental or occasional manifestations. 
 Why does this matter? Isn’t an accidentally produced good argument just as 
good as a virtuously produced one? Even if we ignore the equivocation on both 
“good” and “argument” in this question, the answer is still “No” and for the same 
reasons that accidentally true beliefs do not count as knowledge.4 Otherwise, 
arguers would not have the requisite “ownership” of their arguments, a relation that 
grounds responsibility and the assignment of blame and credit. 
 And now, when we turn to asking what the virtues are that ground the role 
for virtues in argumentation, the earlier discussion comes back to bite us: having 
recognized so many different arguers, we have to acknowledge the possibility of 
different skill sets and different, possibly even incompatible virtues. Hilary 
Kornblith, in a delightfully provocative essay called “Distrusting Reason,” gave voice 
to this idea: 
 
Reason-giving requires a wide range of skills that need not be present in the 
reasons-responsive person… the ability to form one’s beliefs in a way that is 
responsive to evidence is not at all the same as the ability to present reasons for 
one’s beliefs. (Kornblith, 1999, p. 277) 
 
The idea can be extended even further to spectators: 
 
When we think of someone who argues well as someone who marshals evidence, 
correctly draws inferences, and presents it well, we are putting them in the 
proponent’s chair. Why not someone with whom it is good to argue, e.g., by listening 
well and asking the right questions, then accepts well-reasoned argumentation? 
 
An opponent’s ability to identify weaknesses in an argument are not always 
coincident with the ability to construct reasons in support of already adopted 
conclusions; neither must a judge necessarily have those proponent virtues; and 
open-mindedness, sometimes cited as the arguer’s virtue par excellence (Hare, 
1985) can actually be detrimental to the proponent’s more partisan task (Miller & 
Cohen, 2008). 
 
                                                        
4 Kvanvig 2003 devotes several chapters to this question. 
DANIEL H. COHEN 
11 
9. DIFFERENT ARGUERS – AND DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS 
 
I said earlier that in order to extract meaning from the concept of a fully satisfying 
argument, we need to decide what counts as an argument, who counts as a 
participant, and what counts as satisfying. Starting with satisfaction, we were led to 
expand the concept of an arguer. Now, with the wide array of arguer-roles to 
consider, and each with its own skill-set and accompanying virtues, does the idea of 
an argument also have to grow a little? I think so, but not in ways that pose any 
significant problems for the virtues approach. If we think there are relevantly 
different kinds of arguments, Virtue Argumentation Theory can be easily adapted 
because it already accommodates a plurality of virtues. On the other hand, the 
plurality in Virtue Argumentation Theory is no obstacle to integration because even 
if we discern a single telos covering all kinds of argumentation, that need not 
translate into a single telos for all arguers. 
And yet, in the end I would like to suggest that the common concept of an 
argument does need some expansion, not enlarge the range or extension of the 
concept, but rather to include its context. 
 
10. CONCLUSION: MISE-EN-SCENE 
 
Admittedly, many of the details are missing from this basic framework for thinking 
about completely satisfying arguments. Questions such as just which virtues are 
needed for the different roles in arguments, how they might relate to one another, 
how conflicts among them be resolved, and how they differ from skills, have all been 
side-stepped here – mostly because all of them have been addressed at length by 
others elsewhere. What is missing and has not been addressed at length is precisely 
the context for an argument.  
When it comes to satisfying arguments, the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts, especially if the only parts we recognize as relevant are the arguers 
themselves. The venue matters. Evaluating an argument apart from its context is 
analogous to evaluating the inferential part of an argument, its illative core, apart 
from its dialectical tier: there are important things to be said about it, but there is 
more to the story. The wrong time or place can be as detrimental to the success of 
an argument as bad arguers. But so can the wrong arguers, not matter how good 
they are. And the same needs to be said about the subject matter, for if we lack the 
standing to effect the changes called for by the consensus that we reach, that too 
detracts from its satisfactoriness. So, unless we extend the concept of virtue to apply 
to contexts, and then talk about the “virtues of venues,” virtue theory will not be 
enough. And that is inadvisable because it would require irreparable damage to the 
concept of a virtue as an inculcated habit of character. 
Let me end, then, back where I began, with the virtues of OSSA.  
It is no accident that there would be satisfying arguments here at this 
conference because it is the right place and the right time to argue, and we are the 
right people for arguing about the subjects of the arguments that will take place 
over the next few days.  
And besides, good arguments at OSSA? That’s the tradition! 
DANIEL H. COHEN 
12 
REFERENCES 
 
Aberdein, A. (2010). Virtue in Argument. In: Argumentation, 24, 165-179. 
Aberdein, A. (2007). Virtue Argumentation. In Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International 
Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: SICSAT. 
Cohen, D. H. (forthcoming). “Skepticism and argumentative virtues.” Cogency. 
Cohen, D. H. (2008). “Now THAT was a good argument! On the virtues of arguments and the virtues 
of arguers.” CEAR, Santiago Chile. 
The GoodWork Project: http://goodworkproject.org  
Greco, J.. (1999) Against Reliabilism. In: Philosophical Perspectives, 13: Epistemology.  
Hare, W. (1985). In Defence of Open-Mindedness. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Kornblith, H. (1999). Distrusting Reason. In P. A. French & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.)Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 23. Boston, MA: Blackwell. 
Kvanvig, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Miller, G., & Cohen, D. (2008). Gods, gadflies, and bulldog tenacity: In defense of closed-mindedness. 
Conference on open-mindedness and the virtues in education. Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
Sosa, E. (1980) The Raft and the Pyramid. In: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V: Studies in 
Epistemology. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN. 
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
